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Spectatorship and Social Cognition 
 
This paper places Per Persson's book Understanding Cinema in relation to cognitive film theory and 
the increasing necessity of it to further engage with the psychological and anthropological literature on 
social cognition. This paper focuses upon Persson's ability to integrate cognitive and cultural 
perspectives when explaining a spectator's comprehension of point‐of‐view editing, variable framing 
and character psychology. It is argued that Persson's theoretical framework would have been more 
explanatorily complete if it had adopted an analytical dualist stance as a means to theorise the 
ontologically mixed nature of the psychological processes in question. 
Since its initial development in the 1980s, a central theme of cognitive film theory has been its 
rejection of a pervasive view within film studies that every aspect of the mental life of the spectator is 
to be understood as shaped or constituted by social factors, be such points of determination 
conceived as language, discourse or culture. In their attempt to emphasise innate and universal 
dimensions of spectatorial response, a number of cognitive film theorists have tended to focus upon 
lower order processes, such as perception and object recognition, and have expended less effort 
providing cognitive accounts of higher order processes such as judgement, inference and 
interpretation (Eitzen 1993; Prince 1993; Anderson 1996; Carroll1996a; Grodal 1997). This has 
prompted critics of cognitive film theory to claim, as Robert Stam does, that the theory 
allows little room for the politics of location, or for the socially shaped investments, ideologies, 
narcissisms, and desires of the spectator, all of which seem too irrational and messy for the theory to 
deal with.… A focus on cognitive commonalities across all cultures exists below the threshold of 
cultural and social difference, and therefore discourages analysis of tensions rooted in history or 
culture. 
(2000, pp. 241–242) 
As Stam's comments reveal, many film theorists find the cognitivist focus upon internal psychological 
processes problematic since it leads analysis away from the investigation of the social forces and 
contextual factors shaping spectatorial response. 
Such criticisms are not wholly fair. No cognitive film theorist claims that spectatorial response is in no 
way influenced by a spectator's social context. Indeed, some cognitive film theorists have explicitly 
theorised the social dimensions of cognition and their role within spectatorship (Bordwell 1989a, 
pp. 28–32; 1996, pp. 94–95; Smith 1995, pp. 46–52; Carroll 1996b, pp. 268–272; Tan 1996, pp. 163–
171). And if one recognises film criticism as a specialised form of spectatorial activity, then David 
Bordwell's Making Meaning should be understood as a cognitive account of the institutional 
conventions and imperatives informing the interpretive practices manifested within it 
(Bordwell 1989b). 
However, these criticisms of cognitive film theory are not wholly misplaced. Most cognitive film 
theorists have not extensively engaged with the cognitive literature in social psychology and cognitive 
anthropology as a means to address questions pertaining to the relations between social identity and 
spectatorship, even though the relevance of such approaches to these fundamental questions is 
patent (Holland & Quinn 1987; D'Andrade & Strauss 1992; Strauss & Quinn 1997; McGarty et 
al.2002; Brubaker et al. 2004). In addition, there are good reasons to be sceptical about extreme 
nativist claims. Not all cognitivists necessarily maintain a strong nativist stance in which our mental 
‘hardware’ is viewed as being predominantly innately determined. As Bradd Shore observes, the 
concept of ‘adaptive intelligence’ within neurobiology assumes that neural connections are plastic 
over the course of mental development in ways that are responsive to the social environment (1996, 
pp. 16–18). From the perspective of adaptive intelligence, social construction and cognitive 
psychology are not inherently irreconcilable. This would suggest that a more productive avenue for 
cognitive film theory to take would be a middle path in which other cultural approaches can be 
potentially incorporated without necessarily involving the importation of dubious radical constructivist 
assertions, such as that biology and evolutionary psychology are irrelevant to the study of film 
spectator, or even worse, completely ideologically suspect. 
Per Persson's recent book Understanding Cinema is a welcome contribution to cognitive film theory 
primarily because of his attempt to chart such a middle course between nativist assumptions on the 
one hand and broader cultural and historical considerations on the other. Unlike most other cognitive 
film theorists, Persson invokes a wide range of approaches derived from the social psychological and 
cognitive anthropological literature to aid his explanations of how spectators construct filmic meaning. 
However, in this paper I do not want to limit myself to merely providing an overview of Persson's 
cultural–cognitive approach, original as it is. I also want to question his methodological decision to 
remain agnostic with respect to specifying the ontological nature of the psychological processes he 
describes. I will show that an increase in explanatory purchase is to be had when the relations 
between the psychological and the cultural domains are actively theorised as opposed to just 
assuming that both are in play in shaping spectatorial response. 
The central concepts Persson deploys in his study of cinematic spectatorship are ‘understanding’ and 
‘dispositions’ (pp. 7–13). Understanding is construed broadly to cover the psychological activities by 
which a person imposes order and makes sense of the phenomenal world, with the film text perceived 
as just one manifestation of the phenomenal. Dispositions refer to the set of mental structures that 
guide this sense‐making activity. Persson sees the parameters of these dispositions set neither wholly 
by innately specified mental modules nor by socially shared schemas but by a spectrum of factors 
running between the two (pp. 13–19). According to Persson, his integrative stance ‘does not give 
answers to the origin of individual dispositions; it only acknowledges that causes of dispositions must 
be sought on many levels in an ecumenical spirit’ (p. 19). This integrative stance is best revealed by 
Persson positing a continuum between six levels of filmic meaning and the dispositions that underlie 
these sense‐making activities (pp. 26–34). At the most basic level are those meanings that derive 
from the spectator's basic perceptual abilities, such as object recognition and depth perception. 
Amongst the highest and most abstract level of meanings are those associated with establishing the 
communicative intentions of filmmaker or the application of interpretive grids as a means to make 
sense of a film. In between these levels Persson posits a number of intermediary ones which manifest 
increasing orders of complexity and which are connected with a spectator's abilities to categorise and 
attribute the mental states of characters. Persson is not the first to put forward the notion that the best 
way to capture spectatorial comprehension is through presenting it as a continuum. Both David 
Bordwell and Umberto Eco have done so earlier, although Eco, in notable contrast to Bordwell and 
Persson, viewed the continuum semiotically, as the operation of socially learnt codes, even with 
respect to basic object recognition abilities (Eco 1976; Bordwell 1996, pp. 93–96). Although few would 
contest the claim that both Bordwell's and Persson's cognitive accounts are clearly superior than 
Eco's semiotic construal of the continuum, what is notable is that Persson's account is more 
exhaustive than Bordwell's, despite their similar cognitive underpinnings. 
The rest of Persson's book constitutes an application of his understanding and dispositions model to 
three key areas of spectatorial comprehension: point‐of‐view (POV) editing; variable framing 
understood in relation to conceptions of personal space; and character psychology and mental 
attribution. In all instances, Persson invokes dispositions which are innately prefigured and those 
which are more culturally based to delineate the relevant factors involved. An illustrative instance of 
this is Persson's psychological revision of Noël Carroll's more philosophically oriented account of a 
spectator's comprehension of POV editing (Carroll 1996b). While both claim that deictic gaze 
behaviour (the ability of a person to infer the object of another person's gaze) forms the basis by 
which a spectator is able to comprehend POV editing, Persson is reluctant to explain its ontogenetic 
manifestation wholly by reference to evolutionary psychology, as Carroll does. Persson suggests a 
more dialectical interaction between nature and culture, one in which basic untutored psychological 
skills possess a ‘genetic basis that provides us with some predisposition to develop patterns such as 
deictic gaze but whose actual development probably demands a rich physical and social environment’ 
(p. 73). 
As indicated earlier, since Persson's integrative approach takes an agnostic stance on the question of 
the origin of dispositions, he prefers to stress the universality of the deictic gaze as a contingent 
universal rather than enter into a discussion upon its precise ontological nature. This is a significant 
point I will return to later. For the moment, it is important to recognise that Persson adds a historical 
dimension to his account, one which is notably absent in Carroll's explanation. The spectatorial 
application of deictic gaze skills to a film sequence is also contingent upon the cinematic regime of 
spatiality dominant within the historical period (pp. 48–66). Persson argues that during the cinema's 
first 10 years the dominant regime of spatiality employed was that of the model provided by the 
theatre and vaudeville in which the spectator was not immersed in the film's fictional space. From 
1906 onward, however, a narrative system developed that stressed the spatial articulation of shots 
and the relations of characters within these fictional spaces. According to Persson, it is within this 
latter context that POV editing developed by fulfilling specific narrative functions such as facilitating a 
spectator's comprehension of narrative space and by providing greater psychological depth to 
characters (pp. 64–65). One of the strengths of Persson's integrative stance is its ability to be 
additionally sensitive to the historically contingent. 
This pattern of explaining aspects of spectatorial comprehension by an appeal to the dual registers of 
the innately specified and the cultural is manifested in the book's other case studies. Whereas the 
comprehension of POV editing rested upon the psychological disposition to understand the deictic 
gaze behaviour of others, the comprehension of the narrative significance of variable framing instead 
relies upon the psychological disposition to understand personal space. Persson defines personal 
space as just ‘one specific level of proxemics’ that relates to conceptions of personal territory as 
opposed to all forms of social surroundings (p. 103). From a cinematic standpoint, the most significant 
aspect of personal space is what Edward Hall calls the ‘intimate’ zone, a region of space that defines 
not only intimate relations between people but also threatening invasions of that space that are 
interpreted as potential threats to one's body (pp. 104–108). As Persson points out, closer framings 
often exploit the spectator's sense of personal space as either markers of intimacy between two 
characters or as invasive threats against a character through an extreme close‐up of a fist or a 
weapon. Again, Persson does not specify the ontological nature of the disposition, arguing that ‘it is 
impossible to say whether the development of personal‐space is driven by genetics or social learning’ 
and provides empirical evidence for both positions (p. 108). 
The chapter on character psychology and mental attribution is Persson's most important contribution 
to the theorisation of spectatorship. Cognitive film theorists have long recognised the centrality of 
character with respect to a spectator's comprehension and emotional responses to narrative film 
(Bordwell et al. 1985, pp. 12–18; Smith 1995, pp. 17–35; Livingston1996, pp. 149–171). What 
Persson's understanding and dispositions model adds to these discussions is a greater psychological 
specification of the processes underlying character comprehension (p. 150). Persson applies the 
continuum of six levels of comprehension to describe the psychological processes involved in 
character comprehension and, although it is the most systematic application of the continuum in the 
book, he adds a seventh level pertaining to the categorisation of character with respect to their 
perceived social role(s) (pp. 154–156).1 While one would readily admit that the categorisation of 
character with respect to their depicted social role is a significant element of character 
comprehension, it is unclear why Persson places this at the highest level of mental abstraction. 
Ascertaining the occupancy role of a police officer in uniform in a film does not appear to be more 
computationally difficult than inferring his or her occurrent mental states or their personality traits, 
competencies Persson places at level 4 and 5, respectively. The danger here is that certain elements 
of the comprehension continuum appear to be distinguished in an ad hoc fashion rather than 
reflecting a principled gradient registering higher orders of cognitive complexity or abstractedness. 
Persson proposes that the ability to attribute mental states to a character is only partly explained 
through a spectator's attention to their speech, facial expressions and bodily gestures as clues to their 
inner life. Subtending this ability are broader inter‐related assumptions on the nature of mental life that 
the spectator possesses, a position that Murray Smith had partially staked out through the 
deployment of the concept of a ‘person schema’ (1995, pp. 20–24). To describe these assumptions, 
Persson borrows from the cognitive psychological literature the concept of ‘folk psychology’, an 
internal model of the mind which consists of ‘a naive, common‐sense “theory” about the constituents 
and common processes of the psyche and how these are related to actions and behaviour’ (p. 163). 
Included in the Western model of the mind are assumptions such as: actions are caused by desires 
and beliefs; beliefs and thoughts are reciprocally informed by one's perceptions; and emotions and 
physiological states motivate desire (pp. 164–170). In a move that should dispel the erroneous belief 
that cognitive film theory is not sensitive to the shaping influences of culture on mental processes, 
Persson is emphatic that folk psychology is a cultural model that varies with respect to cultural 
context, historical period, age and cognitive abilities (here Persson invokes the classic example of 
autistic children and their difficulties inferring the mental states of others) (pp. 176–177). However, 
this does not lead Persson to assume a relativist stance which denies the universality of certain core 
assumptions of folk psychology, although he once again sidesteps the issue whether such universality 
can be explained partially by an appeal to an innate mental module devoted to the task of mental 
attribution. Through a series of case studies, the remainder of the chapter consists of compelling 
demonstrations of how a spectator's comprehension of a character's goals, perceptions and emotions 
can be exhaustively explained by recourse to folk psychological assumptions. 
As an advancement upon existing cognitive film theory, Understanding Cinema offers a helpful 
negotiation between the cognitive and cultural perspectives that are currently separated by 
unproductive theoretical divisions. Its exploration of various social cognition dimensions shaping 
spectatorial response provides a needed counterbalance to cognitive work primarily weighted toward 
the study of the lower order and more biologically based cognitive processes. And Persson's 
increased psychological specification of the cognitive processes involved in the comprehension of 
POV editing, variable framing and character psychology provides ample proof of how a cognitive 
approach can supply fine‐grained explanations to complex questions involving a range of diverse 
factors. 
In the face of such accomplishments, it may seem churlish to then find fault with Persson's 
methodological decision to refrain from adjudicating upon the ontological nature of the psychological 
dispositions he describes. However, there are opportunities to further refine Persson's explanatory 
framework in ways which do not depart from his central premises. To do so involves assuming a 
moderate social constructivist stance which recognises the mixed ontological nature of the 
psychological domain while theorising the interplay between the innate and cultural dimensions of 
cognition instead of leaving such questions to one side. 
Elsewhere I have argued that film historians would benefit by adopting the analytical dualist approach 
that the sociologist Margaret Archer has advocated when theorists are faced with domains that are 
ontologically mixed (Romao 2003, pp. 32–39). Analytical dualism consequently represents a position 
that maintains ontological distinctions rather than effecting their theoretical erasure. In so doing, one 
can identify the emergent properties of different ontological factors and explain a developmental 
process through their interplay over time. As Archer's own work within sociology shows, there are 
inherent limitations with the work of social theorists who conflate structure and agency, be they 
‘downward conflationists’ who envisage agents as the embodiments of social structures, or ‘upward 
conflationists’ who argue that social structures are epiphenomenal and ultimately reducible to the 
activities of agents (Archer 1995, 1996). More recently, Archer has extended this line of analysis to 
current debates on the nature of the human subject as a means to critique postmodernists who 
routinely conflate its natural and social dimensions (Archer 2000). 
It does not take much effort to see that there is a similar necessity of maintaining ontological 
distinctions within the theorisation of film spectatorship. A downward conflationist approach to the 
psychological that treated spectatorial response as nothing more than the manifestation of culture 
would envisage a spectator without mental or biological endowment. Equally, an upward conflationist 
approach that treated spectatorial response solely in terms of innately specified mental processes 
would conceive of a spectator stripped of his or her social identity and untouched by their social 
environment. Since both approaches have obvious limitations, it would be wiser to adopt an analytical 
dualist stance that respected both the innately specified and the culturally shaped aspects of 
cognition. Notably, this stance is becoming increasingly advocated in cultural anthropology in ways 
which mirror Archer's analytical dualist approach. In their book, A Cognitive Theory of Cultural 
Meaning, Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn draw conclusions that are equally applicable to debates 
on film spectatorship. In their view: 
[T]he inner world or psyche and the world outside of persons are not isolated realms and that too 
large a gulf has been posited between them in current theorising. It is central to our view, however, 
that these realms are different, with distinctive characteristics not found in the other. In our view the 
intrapersonal and the extrapersonal realms are distinct but closely interconnected; they are separated 
by a boundary, but one that is permeable. 
(1997, p. 8) 
While Strauss and Quinn do not invoke the concept of analytical dualism, its methodological principles 
are clearly in tune with their recommendations. Just as the separation of structure from agency 
facilitated explaining social stasis or change, so too does the intrapersonal and the extrapersonal 
distinction enable explaining the stability, or the possibilities of variation, in cultural meanings. 
If one were to place Persson's work in relation to the principles of analytical dualism, it would be 
inaccurate to call him either a downward or upward conflationist. If anything, his refusal to pass 
judgement on the ontological status of psychological processes prevents him from going down either 
of those paths. Despite this, it would seem that his integrative stance is intended to signal that both 
biologically innate and cultural factors are to be considered in tandem when analysing the multiple 
factors shaping a psychological disposition. The problem is that once one accepts that most 
psychological questions require both biological and cultural answers, then it is incumbent upon the 
theorist to reflect upon their interrelations. To recall, when Persson proposed his compromise 
approach to explaining deictic gaze behaviour, one of his suggestions was that innate factors are to 
be understood as predispositions whose development is influenced by the socio‐cultural environment. 
This is an interrelationship that needs to be theorised and preferably in a non‐conflationary manner. 
Are all innate predispositions equally culturally malleable? What properties determine the extent of 
their malleability? Precisely which socio‐cultural conditions enable the development of a 
predisposition and which conditions act as a break on their development? To be sure, these are 
broader theoretical questions that go beyond the traditional remit of film theory, ones which a 
developmental psychologist or a cognitive anthropologist would be in a far better position to answer. 
While Persson's theoretical framework unfortunately does not provide answers to such issues, it 
would be all the more powerful if it did. 
Notes 
1. To avoid confusion, while Persson refers to the comprehension of a character's social role at ‘level 
6’, it is technically the seventh since he starts his discussion at ‘level 0’. 
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